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Appellee James Friedman ("Friedman") hereby submits his Brief
of the Appellee.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(3)(j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
This appeal presents the following issues:
1.

Did the district court correctly rule that, as a matter

of law, a note executed by Friedman in 1987 was void for lack of
consideration?

That ruling is reviewed for correctness, without

deferring to the district court's legal conclusions.

Bonham v.

Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1990).
2.

Did the district court correctly rule that, as a matter

of law, the 1987 Note did not revive a loan Appellant Danny Kramer
("Kramer") allegedly made to Friedman in 1981?

That ruling is

reviewed for correctness, without deferring to the district court's
legal conclusions.

Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah

1990).
3.

Did the district court correctly rule that, as a matter

of law, Kramer was not harmed by Friedman's alleged fraud?
ruling is reviewed

That

for correctness, without deferring to the

district court's legal conclusions.

Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d

497, 499 (Utah 1990).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Course of Proceedings
Kramer originally brought suit on a promissory note Friedman

executed in 1987 for the sum of $15,000 (the "1987 Note") .
Complaint, R. 2-3.

See

Kramer later filed an Amended Complaint, in

which he also claimed that the 1987 Note constituted a written
acknowledgement of a loan of $5,000 Kramer had allegedly made to
Friedman in 1981 (the "1981 Loan"), thereby reviving that loan, and

2

that Friedman had defrauded Kramer in executing the 1987 Note. See
Amended Complaint, R. 50-58.
Friedman moved for summary judgment, contending that, as a
matter of law, the 1987 Note was void for lack of consideration,
the 1987 Note did not revive the 1981 Loan and Kramer had failed
to show he was harmed by Friedman's alleged fraud.

See Motion for

Summary Judgment, R. 39-40. The district court granted Friedman's
Motion, ruling as follows:
I am of the view that as inequitable, Mr. Rognlie,
as it may be, that the limitations period in this case
did commence on the date that the Amended Complaint
states it did and based upon the testimony in the
deposition of Mr. Kramer.
I am, moreover, convinced that there has been no
acknowledgement to comply with the law of this state and
that the consideration, alleged consideration, must fail
because there was no obligation owing at the time of the
note in March of '87.
See

Reporter's

Transcript

of

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

Proceedings, p. 21, 11. 1-10 (attached hereto as Addendum "A").
II.

Statement of Facts
The following facts were deemed admitted solely for the

purpose of Friedman's Motion for Summary Judgment.

No genuine

issues of material fact exist.
1.

On or about March 12, 1981, Kramer loaned Friedman the

sum of $5,000 (the "1981 Loan").

See Amended Complaint, para. 9,

R. 29.
3

2.

Friedman agreed to repay the 1981 Loan within sixty to

ninety days of March 12, 1981.

See Amended Complaint, para. 13,

R. 52; Deposition of Daniel Albert Kramer ("Kramer Deposition"),
R. 89, 93, and Correction Sheet, R. 155.
3.

On

or

about

March

21,

1987, Friedman

executed

a

promissory note in Kramer's favor for the sum of $15,000 (the "1987
Note").1

See Amended Complaint, para. 3, R. 50; Promissory Note,

attached hereto as Addendum "B".
4.

On June 10, 1988, Kramer commenced this action to collect

on the 1987 Note. See Complaint, R. 2-3. Kramer later amended his
complaint to state two additional causes of action on the 1987 Note
one

for

a

determination

that

the

Note

was

a

written

acknowledgment of the 1981 Loan and one that Friedman defrauded
Kramer by giving Kramer the 1987 Note.
50-58.
5.

See Amended Complaint, R.

Kramer has never sued on the 1981 Loan.
Kramer explained the delay in commencing an action on the

grounds that he had granted Friedman extensions of time to repay

x

Kramer relies on the Friedman Deposition, R. 116-117, 120,
128, for the proposition that Friedman acknowledged the existence
of the 1981 Loan when he executed the 1987 Note and agreed to sign
that note as a compromised payoff of the 1981 Loan. The pages in
the record cited by Kramer do not support that proposition.
4

the 1981 Loan when Friedman confessed he could not repay the 1981
Loan.2
6.

See, Kramer Affidavit, para. 8, R. 81.
Sometime in December, 1987 or August, 1988, after the

1987 Note was signed, Friedman made a payment of $1,110.65 on
Kramer's behalf to First Interstate Bank.

See Kramer Affidavit,

para. 10, R. 82; Deposition of James E. Friedman

("Friedman

Deposition"), R. 107.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1) determines whether the 1981 Loan
was an enforceable obligation when the 1987 Note was executed.
That statute provides as follows:
Within four years:
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation or
liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; also
on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and
for any article charged on a store account; also on an
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or
materials furnished; provided, that action in all of the
foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within four
years after the last charge is made or the last payment
is received.

2

In his brief, Kramer relies upon the Friedman Deposition, R.
114-15, 121, as support for the proposition that Friedman requested
and obtained extensions of time in which to repay the 1981 loan.
The pages in the record cited by Kramer do not support that
proposition.
5

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 determines whether the 1987 Note
constitutes a written acknowledgement of the 1981 Loan.

That

statute provides as follows:
In any case founded upon a contract, when any part
of the principal or interest shall have been paid or an
acknowledgement of an existing liability, debt or claim
or any promise to pay the same, shall have been made, an
action may be brought within the period prescribed for
the same after such payment, acknowledgement or promise;
but such acknowledgement or promise must be in writing
signed by the parties being charged thereby. When a
right of action is barred by the provisions of any
statute, it shall be unavailable either as a cause of
action or a ground of defense.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

All of the consideration Kramer has alleged he exchanged

for the 1987 Note is based on the 1981 Loan.

Thus, the validity

of that consideration depends on whether the 1981 Loan was an
enforceable obligation when the 1987 Note was executed.

Kramer's

cause of action on the 1981 Loan arose within 60 to 90 days of
March 12, 1981, when that loan became due and payable.
Kramer's extensions of time for repayment did not modify the
parties' agreement in that regard because those extensions were not
supported by consideration.

Consequently, pursuant to the four-

year statute of limitation provided in Utah Code .Ann. § 78-1225(1), the 1981 Loan was no longer an enforceable obligation when
the 1987 Note was executed.
6

Friedman

is not estopped

from asserting the statute of

limitations because that argument was not raised below and the
undisputed evidence below did not establish grounds for estoppel.
The 1987 Note also did not constitute an accord and satisfaction.
Before the district court, Kramer neither argued nor adequately
supported

his

contention

that

the

1987

settlement of doubtful and disputed claims.

Loan

constituted

a

The district court

correctly ruled that, as a matter of law, the 1987 Note was void
for lack of consideration.
2.

Since the 1987 Note does not in any way refer to the 1981

Loan or contain an unequivocal acknowledgment or promise to pay any
existing

debt,

that

note

does

acknowledgement of the 1981 loan.

not

constitute

a

written

Moreover, since Kramer has

neither sued on the 1981 Loan directly nor plead that a partial
payment revived that obligation, the district court properly
granted Friedman summary judgment on the Second Cause of Action set
forth in the Amended Complaint.
3.

Kramer alleges that Friedman defrauded him in connection

with the execution of the 1987 Note. All of the harm that Kramer
alleges he suffered, however, is based on the 1981 Loan.

Since,

with or without the alleged fraud, Kramer could not have enforced
the 1981 Loan, when the 1987 Note was executed, Kramer has not

7

alleged any harm flowing from the alleged fraud.

Accordingly,

summary judgment was properly granted on Kramer's fraud claim.

ARGUMENT
I.

Standard of Review
This appeal involves the purely legal issue of whether the

district court correctly ruled that Friedman is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law based on the material, undisputed facts
presented by Kramer. See Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah
1989); White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1316 (Utah App. 1990);
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The Court must review the low€*r court's

legal conclusions for correctness and need not defer to those
conclusions.

Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App.

1990); CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, 772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah
1989).
consider

In reviewing the summary judgment, the Court must also
the

facts

in the

Whatcott. 790 P.2d at 580.

light most

favorable

to Kramer.

None of those facts were disputed by

Friedman for purposes of his motion.

Under those standards, the

district court properly granted Friedman summary judgment and its
decision should be affirmed.
II.

The Court Should Disregard Arguments Raised for the First Time
on Appeal.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated as follows:

8

For a question to be considered on appeal, the record
must clearly show that it was timely presented to the
trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling
thereon; we cannot merely assume that it was properly
raised. The burden is on the parties to make certain
that the record they compile will adequately preserve
their arguments for review in the event of an appeal.
IFG Leasing v. Gordon, 776 P.2d 607, 616 (Utah 1989) (quoting
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040,
1045 (Utah 1983)).
Consequently, Utah appellate courts have persistently refused
to consider arguments that were not raised in the trial court.
See, e.g., Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Nat'l American Title Insurance
Co. , 749 P.2d 651, 657 (Utah 1988) (refusing to consider estoppel
argument where

estoppel

not

argued

to

trial

court);

Turtle

Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc. , 645 P.2d 667, 672
(Utah 1982) (refusing to consider defense that was plead but not
argued below); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d
42,

46

(Utah App. 1988)

(refusing to address challenges to

affidavit that were not raised below).
In this case, Kramer is arguing for the first time on appeal
that (1) the statute of limitations did not begin to run while
Kramer was making interest payments that were "reimbursable" by
Friedman, (2) Friedman is estopped from asserting the statute of
limitations and (3) the 1987 Note constituted a settlement of
doubtful and disputed claims.

See Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-15,
9

17-18. Kramer failed to give the district court an opportunity to
consider and rule on those arguments and they should not be
addressed by this Court.

See Zions First Nat'l Bank, 749 P.2d at

657. In addition, for the reasons set forth below, those arguments
are without merit.

See infra. pp. 16 n. 5 and 19-25.

III. The district court correctly ruled that, as a matter of law,
the 1987 Note was void for lack of consideration.
All of the consideration Kramer alleged he exchanged for the
1987 Note was based on the 1981 Loan. See Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 69.
Loan

was

unenforceable

when

the

1987

Note

was

If the 1981
given,

no

consideration was given for the 1987 Note. In addition, Kramer is
now contending, for the first time, that (i) he agreed to settle
a doubtful and disputed claim through the 1987 Note and that his
"compromise" adequately supports the note, and (ii) Friedman should
be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense. See
Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-15 and 17-18.
Before the district court, Kramer failed to show that the 1981
Loan was enforceable when the 1987 Note was executed, and failed
to present any evidence either that the 1987 Note involved the
settlement of a disputed claim or in support of his contention that
Friedman

should

be

estopped

from

10

asserting

the

statute

of

limitations.

Accordingly the district court correctly ruled that

the 1987 Note was void for lack of consideration.
A.

The district court properly ruled that, as a matter of
law, the 1981 Loan was due and payable within 60 to 90
days of March 12, 1981.

On appeal, Kramer does not dispute that the 1981 Loan was an
obligation not founded on a written instrument. Kramer's cause of
action on that loan arose, and thus the statute of limitations
began to

run, on the date that

loan was

due and payable.

Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34, 36 (Utah 1983)
(statute of limitations begins to run the moment a cause of action
arises); O'Hair v. Kounalis, 23 Utah 2d 355, 463 P.2d 799, 800
(1970) (cause of action on a debt begins to run when the debt is
due and payable).

Accordingly, Kramer was required to bring an

action on that loan within four years of the date the 1981 Loan
became due and payable.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1).

In his Amended Complaint and throughout his deposition, Kramer
alleged that the 1981 Loan was due and payable within 60 to 90 days
of March 12, 1981. See Amended Complaint, para. 13, R. 52; Kramer
Deposition, R. 89, 93, and Correction Sheet, R. 155.

Kramer,

however, also alleges that he granted Friedman extensions of time
in which to repay the loan and contends that those extensions
prevented the statute of limitations from expiring on the 1981

11

Loan. See Kramer Affidavit, para. 8, R. 81; Appellant's Brief, pp.
12-13.
Kramer is essentially arguing that although the parties agreed
that the 1981 Loan was due and payable within 60 to 90 days of
March 12, 1981, they later modified that agreement to extend the
due date into the indefinite future. Kramer correctly states that
the parties could orally modify their agreement. See Ted R. Brown
& Associates v. Carnes, 753 P.2d

964, 968 (Utah App. 1988).

However, Kramer overlooks the fact that, under Utah law, such a
modification is invalid unless supported by consideration. Wilson
v. Gardner, 10 Utah 2d 89, 348 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1960); Bamberger
Co. v. Certified Productions, Inc.. 88 Utah 194, 48 P.2d 489,
(1935); see also Holcombe v. Solinger & Sons Co., 238 F.2d 495, 499
(5th Cir. 1956) (debtor must give valid consideration in exchange
for agreement to extend time for repayment); Superior Concrete
Pumping, Inc. v. David Montoya Const., Inc., 108 N.M. 401, 773 P.2d
346, 349 (1989) (modification of oral contract must be supported
by consideration); Jole v. Bredbenner, 95 Or. App. 193, 768 P.2d
433, 435 (1989); Honolulu Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Murphy, 753
P.2d 807, 813 (Hawaii App. 1988).
For example, in Jole, tenants had fallen far behind on rent
payments pursuant to a month-to-month lease. The landlord and his
tenants had allegedly modified the arrangement by agreeing that,
12

in exchange for, inter alia, a promise to timely remit rent
payments, the landlord would forebear on collecting the amounts
past due.

The landlord later sued to collect the amounts owing

under the lease. The trial court ruled that the landlord was bound
by the modification and dismissed the action.
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
modification was void for lack of consideration.
at 435.

Jole, 768 P.2d

The court stated that since the tenants were already

legally bound to make timely payments, their promises to do so did
not support the landlord's forbearance.

Id.

Thus, the agreement

had not been modified and the landlord could collect the full
amount due.
In contrast, in Murphy, the Hawaii Court of Appeals reversed
a

summary

judgment

in favor of

unconditional guaranty.

a creditor who

sued on an

The guarantor alleged that the creditor

agreed to pursue its real property collateral before suing on the
guaranty, and thus that the guaranty had been modified. Before the
lower court, the guarantor had submitted an affidavit which alleged
that, in exchange for the modification, the guarantor had agreed
to provide information to assist the foreclosure.
The court held that the provision of such information could
constitute consideration. Murphy, 753 P.2d at 814. Consequently,
the court reversed the summary judgment, holding that the affidavit
13

created a genuine issue as to whether the guaranty had been
modified.

Id.; Cf. Holcombe, 238 F.2d at 499 (debtor's transfer

of negotiable trade acceptances to creditor adequately supported
extension of time for repayment); Superior Concrete, 773 P.2d at
346 (modification valid where, in exchange for hourly surcharge,
contractor accepted concrete pours greatly below the guaranteed
minimum).
In this case, Kramer presented no evidence below, by affidavit
or otherwise, regarding the consideration Friedman exchanged for
the

extensions.

Kramer

simply

alleged

that

"Friedman

also

repeatedly requested additional time to repay the loan, and I
agreed to extend the time for repayment of the loan when he so
requested."

See Kramer Affidavit, para. 8, R. 81.

At best, the

record contains evidence that Friedman promised to repay the 1981
Loan, which he was already obligated to do, in exchange for the
extensions.

A promise to perform a preexisting legal duty,

however, does not constitute valid consideration.

Tates, Inc. v.

Little America Refining, Co., 535 P.2d 1228, 1229 (Utah 1975)
(observing that, where a debtor makes a part payment on a debt, the
creditor is ordinarily not bound by any promise to accept that
payment in satisfaction of debt because the debtor has only
performed a preexisting legal duty and has given no consideration
for the promise); see also Jole, 768 P.2d at 435.
14

Thus, unlike the guarantor
demonstrate

that

the

parties

in Murphy,
entered

Kramer

into

an

failed to
enforceable

modification extending the time for repayment of the 1981 Loan.
Instead, the record shows that any extensions of time were not
supported by consideration and thus, as the district court ruled,
the 1981 Loan was due and payable within 60 to 90 days of March 12,
1981.

The statute of limitations began running on that date,

leaving Kramer four years in which to enforce the 1981 Loan.3

3

The cases cited by Kramer do not dictate a contrary result.
Estate of Giguere, 366 N.W.2d 345, 347 (Minn. App. 1985) did hold
that the parties in that case entered into a valid and binding
agreement extending the time for repayment of a note and thus that
the statute of limitations did not begin running until the new due
date.
However, that agreement was not challenged for lack of
consideration and the court did not discuss the issue. Further,
the debtor apparently agreed to sell certain property to satisfy
the note; that agreement could have served as consideration for the
extension.
Further, while Colorado Inv. Services, Inc. v. Hager, 685 P.2d
1371, 1377 (Colo. App. 1984) held that a modification of the time
for performance of a condition does not need consideration, Utah
law requires modifications to be supported by consideration. See
Wilson v. Gardner, 348 P.2d 931, 933 (1960); Bamberger Co. v.
Certified Productions, Inc., 88 Utah 194, 48 P.2d 489, (Utah 1935).
In addition, Intermedics, Inc. v. Grady, 683 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex.
App. 1984) and King v. Edel, 69 Ga. App. 607, 26 S.E.2d 365, 370
(1943) are irrelevant. Grady held that the plaintiff commenced
suit within the limitations period and King held that a renewal
note, executed within the limitations period, extended the time in
which the creditor could sue on the original note. Finally, Ted
R. Brown & Associates v. Carnes, 753 P.2d 964, 968 (Utah App. 1988)
held only that a written contract may be orally modified.
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Kramer's failure to do so rendered Friedman's obligation on the
1981 Loan illusory and not valid consideration for the 1987 Note.
B.

The 1981 Loan was no longer legally enforceable when the
1987 Note was executed; consequently, Kramer gave no
consideration for the note.

Kramer argued below that the 1981 Loan, interest payments on
that loanf Kramer's acceptance of a compromise payoff amount on
that

loan

and

Kramer's

forbearance

consideration for the 1987 Note.

on

that

loan

as

It is undisputed that the 1987

Note was executed on or about March 21, 1987.
Complaint, para. 3, R. 50.

served

See Amended

Thus, by the time that note was

executed, the 1981 Loan, the interest payments related thereto and
the alleged promises could not constitute valid consideration
because the 1981 Loan was no longer legally enforceable.

Manwill

v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177, 178 (1961).4
4

Friedman's partial payment on the 1981 Loan, which was made
in either December, 1987 or August, 1988 does not affect this
result.
See Kramer Affidavit, para. 10, R. 82. Even if that
payment revived the 1981 Loan, it is undisputed that it was made
after the 1987 Note was executed. See Appellant's Brief, p. 8,
para. 16. Thus, when the 1987 Note was executed, the 1981 Loan
remained a barred obligation.
Furthermore, Kramer abandons plain statutory language in
arguing that the statute of limitations did not begin running until
the last interest "charge" was paid by Kramer that was
"reimbursable" by Friedman.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1).
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-25(1) simply cannot be read in that
manner. First, the statute does not state that the limitations
period is tolled while a creditor makes interest payments that are
"reimbursable" by the debtor.
16

In Manwill, plaintiff made payments on defendants' behalf in
1950, 1951, 1952 and 1953, and in 1954 plaintiff transferred a
grazing permit and 18 head of cattle to defendants.

Plaintiff

conceded that the statute of limitations barred an action to
recover those payments and transfers but alleged that defendants
had orally agreed to pay him back within the limitations period.
Plaintiff contended that the oral agreement was supported by the
defendants' moral, if not legally enforceable, obligation to repay
him.

Id.
The Utah Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding that

the moral obligation to repay plaintiff did not constitute valid
consideration.

The Court held that "it seems obvious that if a

contract to be legally enforceable need be anything more than a
naked promise, something more than mere moral consideration is
necessary."5

Id. Thus, the 1981 Loan was not valid consideration

for the 1987 note.

Secondly, the "charge" referred to in the statute means an
additional debt on an open account, not the accrual of interest on
a loan. If interest accrual were a "charge," the statute would be
rendered meaningless since interest is always accruing and the
statute would never begin running.
5

Kuhn v. Mount, 13 Utah 108, 44 P. 1036, 1038 (1896) is not to
the contrary. That case holds merely that an antecedent debt is
sufficient consideration to support a written acknowledgement of
the debt.
17

Furthermore,
consideration

for

Kramer's
the

1987

alleged
Note

promises
because

were

they

detrimental to Kramer no beneficial to Friedman.

not

were

valid
neither

Sugarhouse

Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980); Allen v.
Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 237 P.2d 823, 825 (1951); see
also Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co.,
Inc. , 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). Since the 1981 Loan was not
legally enforceable, Kramer could not have recovered any amount
based on the 1981 Loan and any further collection efforts by him
would have been futile when the parties executed the Note.
Finally, the interest payments Kramer made, which related to
the 1981 Loan, constituted past consideration —
occurred before the promise was made.

events that

Past consideration is

legally equivalent to no consideration since "the promisor is
making his promise because those events occurred, but he is not
making his promise in order to get them. There is no 'bargaining'
....M

Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 P.2d 628, 633 (Utah

App. 1988) (quoting 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 210 (1963)).
Thus, since all four items presented as consideration to the
district court were insufficient, that Court correctly ruled that
the note is void for lack of consideration as a matter of law.
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C.

Kramer did not present any evidence below that the 1987 Note
constituted the settlement of a "disputed" claim; thus, the
district court correctly ruled that the 1987 Note was void for
lack of consideration.
Kramer argues that the 1987 Note was given in consideration

for a compromise of the 1981 Loan obligation.

In essence, Kramer

asserts, for the first time on appeal, that the 1987 Note is an
accord and satisfaction. Kramer's position is somewhat unusual in
that he bases his affirmative claim on an accord and satisfaction
which is typically raised as a defense. Kramer therefore bears the
burden of proving every necessary

element of an accord and

satisfaction. Cove View Excavating & Const, v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474
(Utah App. 1988).
In Tates, Inc. v. Little America Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228,
1229 (Utah 1975), the Supreme Court observed:
Ordinarily, the payment of part of a debt does not
discharge it; and this is true even though the paying
debtor exacts a promise that it will do so. The reason
for this is that in making the part payment, the debtor
is doing nothing more than he is legally obligated to do,
and therefore he gives the creditor no consideration for
the promise that the part payment will be accepted to
discharge the entire debt. However, there may be varying
circumstances in which the debtor is induced by the
request of the creditor to make payment in some manner
other than he is obligated to do; . . .
One of such
variations is "accord and satisfaction.
The Supreme Court later restated that proposition:
As a general rule, a creditor who agrees to accept a
lesser amount than is due is not bound by his agreement
because of lack of consideration.
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Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 733 (Utah 1985).
Likewise, a creditor may not enforce an accord which is not binding
on him.
An accord and satisfaction is a contract and must meet
contractual

requirements.

Id.

at

732.

The

consideration

supporting an accord is the compromise of a bona fide dispute. All
of the authority cited by Kramer support that proposition.
Kramer's accord and satisfaction argument fails, however,
since no dispute was compromised in this case.

Prior to signing

the 1987 Note, Friedman never disputed the existence or amount of
the obligation arising under the 1981 Loan. Indeed, Kramer asserts
that "Friedman has always acknowledged and admitted . . . owing the
original

$5,000.00 plus a reasonable amount of interest, or

possibly an 'exorbitant' amount of interest if Kramer could prove
it was paid."

Appellant's Brief, p. 6, para. 9.

It was only

Kramer's opinion that the $15,000.00 was a compromised amount.
Appellants' Brief, p. 7, para. 12.
The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected such an argument when it
found

that

no

dispute

was

compromised

and,

therefore,

no

consideration was given. Jole v. Bredbenner, 95 Or. App. 193, 768
P.2d 433 (1989).
due.

In Jole, the plaintiff sued on the original debt

The defendants raised, as a defense, an "agreement" regarding

when the debt would be paid. Defendants argued that the agreement
20

was supported by the parties' good-faith settlement of a disputed
claim.
Defendants, however, had presented no evidence to the trial
court that the amount due was in dispute.

Instead, the evidence

indicated that the defendants had simply been unable to make timely
payments. The court, in holding for the plaintiff, stated "because
there was no dispute over the amount owing, no compromise could
have occurred and, thus, as a matter of law, no consideration could
have been supplied

for the August agreement."

Id. at 436.

Likewise, Kramer's "compromise" was not valid consideration because
Kramer presented no evidence that a dispute ever existed.
In addition, Kramer cannot now manufacture a dispute by
arguing that ". . .at the very least substantial doubt existed as
to whether the debt was barred, . . . "

Appellant's Brief, p. 16.

That argument was similarly advanced and rejected in Jole because
there was no evidence to suggest that the parties discussed or were
aware of the statute of limitations defense.
436.

Jole, 768 P.2d at

Likewise, no such evidence exists here.
As a contract, there must be a meeting of the minds to support

an accord and satisfaction. Tates, Inc., 535 P.2d at 1230. Kramer
has presented no facts establishing any bona fide dispute by
Friedman of the 1981 Loan or any meeting of the minds on a
compromised settlement of a dispute.
21

Kramer's argument must

therefore fail.

The trial court correctly found that no valid

consideration was given for the 1987 Note.
D.

Friedman is not estopped from asserting that the 1981
Loan was barred by the statute of limitations.

Kramer has argued for the first time on appeal that Friedman
should be estopped from asserting that the 1981 Loan obligation was
barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations.
argument is flawed.

Kramer's

He failed to plead, brief or argues estoppel

before the trial court or present any facts in support of his
argument. Estoppel requires a statement, admission, act or failure
to act upon which a party reasonably relies to his detriment. CECO
v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Uteih 1989).
Kramer argues that the judgment must be reversed because
material
argument.

issues

of

fact exist with respect to his estoppel

However, Kramer cites no fact which Friedman has

disputed for purposes of summary judgment. Kramer must show facts
which, if substantiated, would establish estoppel.

Kramer has

failed to do so. Rather, Kramer merely concludes that his estoppel
argument presents issues of fact.

It is not enough on appeal to

argue that some set of facts may present issues precluding summary
judgment. Rather, an appellant must show that the facts presented
to the trial court establish the claim.
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If such facts are

disputed, summary judgment is improper.

If the facts presented do

not establish the claim, it does not matter if they are disputed.
Kramer argues only that Friedman admitted liability on and
promised to repay the 1981 Loan on numerous occasions, a fact never
disputed by Friedman for purposes of summary judgment, and that in
response Kramer granted extensions of time to repay the debt or a
period in excess of six years, well past the expiration of the four
year statute of limitations.

Yet, Kramer does not cite any

evidence to show that Friedman made any statement or admission or
acted or failed to act in a manner that induced Kramer to forebear
from commencing an action on the 1981 Loan.

Kramer also does not

allege any facts that suggest Kramer's reliance on Friedman's
admissions, if any, was either reasonable or detrimental.
No statements or promises were made to induce Kramer's
forbearance.

No facts were misrepresented by Friedman.

To the

contrary, Friedman's liability was admitted at all times prior to
the expiration of the statutory period.

Friedman made no promise

to do anything or give anything of value to Kramer if he forbore.
Friedman did not conceal any fact from Kramer or mislead Kramer in
any way.

Indeed, Friedman was very open and forthright about his

inability to pay the debt.
Moreover, Kramer's alleged reliance on repeated promises to
pay

an admitted

liability

for more than
23

six years was not

reasonable.

At best, Kramer's "extensions" were based on nothing

more than the standard admissions of a debtor who he could not pay
but might be able to pay in the future.

See Friedman Deposition,

R. 114. Kramer's lack of diligence in pursuing his claim against
Friedman must not be excused simply because Friedman continued to
admit the liability and confessed his breach. If anything, Kramer
should have clearly understood that commencement of an action was
the only recourse available to him.
merely

gratuitous

delays

on

his

Kramer's "extensions" were
part.

By

his

unilateral

forbearance, Kramer must not be allowed to rewrite, avoid or be
excused from the express mandate of the statute of limitations that
actions be timely commenced.
The authority relied on by Kramer in support of his estoppel
argument is distinguishable.

Kramer cites the case of Rice v.

Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969)
for the proposition that the defense of the statute of limitations
may be barred by estoppel based on acts or conduct of the
defendant.

That case involved tort liability and the admissions

of an insurance adjustor that compensation would be paid.

There

the plaintiff established that the adjustor had admitted liability
in negotiations and that based on those admissions, she held let the
statute of limitations expire to her detriment.
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The circumstances in Bomba v. W. L. Belvidere, Inc,y 579 F.2d
1067 (7th Cir. 1978) and Gaoner v. Strekouras, 423 A.2d 1168 (R.I.
1980) were similar.

Each of these cases and Rice involved

settlement negotiations which carried on past the limitations date
and the cessation of those negotiations after the claims were
barred.

In those cases, estoppel was based on the concession of

disputed liability during settlement negotiations. Here there were
no negotiations on or disputes about liability.

Friedman did

nothing and said nothing to lull or mislead Kramer into believing
that it was unnecessary for Kramer to commence an action.
Furthermore, in Rice, Gagner and Bomba, the courts found the
existence of sufficient facts asserted by plaintiff to establish
estoppel and disputes as to those facts.

As discussed above, no

issues of fact exist in this case. Kramer has simply not alleged
facts sufficient to establish estoppel.

Friedman properly raised

the statute of limitations below, and the district court properly
ruled that statute voided the consideration Kramer gave for the
1987 Note.
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IV.

The district court correctly ruled thatf as a matter of law,
the 1987 Note did not constitute a written acknowledgement of
the 1981 Loan.
Contrary to Kramer's argument in his brief, Friedman has not

proffered an "unduly restrictive view" of Utah's acknowledgement
statute, Utah Code Ann, § 78-12-44.

See Appellant's p. 20.

Instead, Friedman's, and the district court's, interpretation of
that statute follows the reasoning of a long line of Utah cases.
In 1896, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows:
So an acknowledgment from which by implication of law a
promise is to be raised ought to be a direct and
unqualified admission of a previous, subsisting debt, for
which the debtor is liable, and which he intends to pay.
Where the promise of acknowledgment raises at best a mere
probable inference to pay, being vague and indeterminate,
and may affect the minds of different persons
differently, it ought not to be held sufficient evidence
to create a new cause of action.
Kuhn v. Mount, 13 Utah 108, 44 P. 1036, 1038 (1896).
In 1934, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[t]h€> debtor's
right not to be harassed upon a stale debt is as absolute as the
creditor's right to collect on a fresh one."

Salt Lake* Transfer

Co.

733,

v.

Shurtliff,

83

Utah

488,

30

P.2d

737

(1934).

Accordingly, the court held that a creditor seeking to revive a
stale

debt

bears

the

acknowledged in writing.

burden

of

proving

Ld. at 736.

that

the

debt was

Further, the court stated

that "[t]he acknowledgment necessary to start the statute anew must
be more than a hint, a reference, or a discussion of an old debt;
26

and must amount to a clear recognition of the claim and liability
as presently existing."

Id. at 737.

Finally, in 1954, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated the
holdings in Kuhn and Shurtliff and stated that "the statute is
satisfied by the acknowledgement of a 'claim' and does not require
that the amount of the claim be acknowledged, or that the claim be
liquidated."

Beck v. Dutchman Coalition Mines Co., 2 Utah 2d 104,

269 P.2d 867, 870 (1954) (emphasis added).
Against that background, Kramer contends that the 1987 Note
is a written acknowledgement of, and therefore revived, the 1981
Loan.

See Appellant's Brief, pp. 19-22.

As a matter of law,

however, the 1987 Note fails the test set forth in Kuhn, Shurtliff
and Beck since that note does not evidence an acknowledgment of
any existing claim, including the 1981 Loan.

The 1987 Note does

not hint at, refer to or discuss the 1981 Loan or any other preexisting

claim.

See

Promissory

Note,

Addendum

B

hereto.

Consequently, the district court correctly ruled that the 1987 Note
did not acknowledge, and therefore did not revive, the 1981 Loan
as a matter of law.
Kramer, however, argues that although the 1987 Note does not
refer to the 1981 Loan or to the existence of any obligation,
extrinsic evidence may be considered to demonstrate that the
parties meant the 1987 Note to acknowledge the 1981 Loan. None of
27

the cases cited by Kramer support that contention.6

All three

cases presuppose that an instrument contains an admission of a preexisting obligation; they simply suggest that where

such an

admission exists, extrinsic evidence may used to identify the
particular debt being admitted or, in the situation alluded to in
Beck, the amount of the debt being admitted.

See Beck, 269 P.2d

at 820.

6

In Citizens Bank of Clovis v. Teel, 106 N.M. 290, 742 P.2d
502 (1987), the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed a stipulated
judgment which stated "that Paul Teel remains personally and
individually liable to The Citizens Bank of Clovis on the
obligations secured by the mortgage from him to The Citizens Bank
of Clovis . . . ." The court held that extrinsic evidence was
admissible to show that the phrase "obligations secured by the
mortgage" referred to a note dated September 17, 1979 and thus
reversed a summary judgment in the debtor's favor. Teel, 742 P.2d
at 504.
In Weirton Ice & Coal Co. v. Weirton Shopping Plaza, Inc., 334
S.E.2d 611 (W.Va. 1985), the West Virginia Supreme Court stated
that extrinsic evidence can show the amount of the debt being
acknowledged. However, in that case, the court merely held that
checks, which were given in partial payment of a debt to a
particular creditor and identified the account and balance of the
debt, constituted written acknowledgements of the debt.
Finally, in House of Falcon v. Gonzalez, 583 S.W.2d 902 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979), the Texas Court of Appeals held that an
"apportionment of liability and indemnity clause" contained in an
agreement between the debtor and a third party was not an
acknowledgement of the debt sued upon. The clause obligated the
debtor to be responsible for liabilities incurred before a certain
date but was insufficient because it did not "specify or
acknowledge any particular debt." In this case, the 1987 Note does
not even refer to debts incurred before a certain date; the note
does not refer to the existence of any debts. See Promissory Note.
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Since the note in this case did not admit the existence of any
debt, Kramer cannot escape the plain language of Utah Code Ann,
§ 78-12-44

and

the

1987

Note

by

regarding the parties' intentions.

introducing

parol

evidence

The district court properly

disregarded such evidence and held that the 1987 Note did not
acknowledge the 1981 Loan as a matter of law.
The 1987 Note also did not revive the 1981 Loan simply because
it contained a promise to pay.

Only "an acknowledgment of an

existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay the same"
can revive a stale debt.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 (emphasis

added). The term "same" must refer to "an existing liability, debt
or claim" and thus a writing must contain a promise to pay an
existing liability before it revives such a liability.

The 1987

Note does not state that Friedman will pay the 1981 Loan or any
other existing liability, and therefore that Note did not revive
the loan.
Finally, Kramer contends that Friedman's partial payment of
the 1981 Loan revived that obligation under Utah Code Ann. § 7812-44.7 Kramer, however, has never sued on the 1981 Loan. Indeed,
7

Kramer also suggests that Friedman's partial payment extended
the period for commencing an action on the 1981 Loan under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1).
See Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-12.
Friedman submits that section 25(1) does not apply where the
statute of limitations has already run on the obligation.
Otherwise, sections 25(1) and 44 would be redundant. Consequently,
Kramer's partial payment argument under section 25(1) is misplaced.
29

his Second Cause of Action, upon which the district court granted
summary judgment, alleges only that the 1987 Note acknowledged and
thereby revived the 1981 Loan.

See Amended Complaint, R. 51-53.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that where an acknowledgement
is

made

after

the

statute

of

acknowledgement must be pleaded

limitations

has

as a basis of

run,

"such

the action. "

Attorney General of Utah v. Pomerov, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277,
1300 (1937).
11

Similarly, the Oregon Court of Appeals has held that

[w] hen a complaint shows on its face that the period for bringing

an action has run, the plaintiff, to avoid the bar, must plead
facts sufficient to show that the delay is excused."

Eldridge v.

Eastmoreland General Hospital, 88 Or. App. 547, 746 P.2d 735, 736
(1987).

Kramer has not sued on the 1981 Loan, but rathea: seeks to

enforce the 1987 Note.

Kramer had an opportunity to amend his

complaint and chose not to sue on the 1981 Loan.

He must not now

be allowed to argue a cause of action not properly before the
district court.
As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, "a defendant must be
extended every reasonable opportunity to prepare his case and to
meet an adversary's claims."

Taylor v. E.M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah

2d 175, 264 P.2d 279, 280 (1953).

In this case, it would be

Consequently, Friedman will only address Kramer's argument that the
partial payment revived the 1981 Loan under section 44.
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manifestly unfair, both to Friedman and to the district court, to
reverse based on a cause of action that was neither pled nor
sufficiently argued.

Regardless of whether the partial payment

revived the 1981 Loan, the district court properly granted Friedman
summary judgment on Kramer's written acknowledgement claim.
V.

The district court correctly ruled that Kramer was not harmed
by Friedman's alleged fraud as a matter of law.
Injury is an essential element of a fraud claim.

Suaarhouse

Finance Co., 610 P.2d at 1374; Pace v. Parish, 122 Utah 141, 247
P.2d

273, 274-75

(1952).

Before the district court, Kramer

contended that Friedman's alleged fraud harmed him by inducing him
to accept a compromise amount as owing on the 1981 Loan and to
forego collection efforts on the 1981 Loan. See Amended Complaint,
R. 53-55.

However, as demonstrated above, the 1981 Loan was

unenforceable when the 1987 Note was executed.

Thus, Kramer's

inability to recover on the 1981 Loan stemm€*d not from Friedman's
alleged fraud but from Kramer's failure to enforce the loan within
the limitations period. Since Kramer did not present any evidence
that Friedman's alleged fraud harmed him, the trial court correctly
entered summary judgment on Kramer's fraud claim.
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CONCLUSION
Kramer had four years in which to sue on the 1981 Loan.
failure to do so has had several consequences.

His

First, it deprived

Kramer of the right to recover on that obligation.

Second, it

rendered meaningless any purported consideration Kramer exchanged
for the 1987 Note.

Finally, it rendered harmless the injuries

Kramer suffered from Friedman's alleged fraud.
arguments

regarding

the extension of the

Moreover, Kramer's

1981 Loan due date,

estoppel, accord and satisfaction, and acknowledgment either were
not properly pled and argued below or are without merit.

The

district court's ruling was proper in all respects and should be
affirmed.
Dated this

/^

day of July, 1990.
ANDERSON & WATKINS

1?

- > ~

Steven W. IJougherty
/Pirn
imothy W. Miller
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License No. 220
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Salt Lake City, Utah
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535-5203

1
2
3

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:

This is the time set for he aring on the

!

motion for summary judgment filed by the Defendant in the

4 ! matter of Danny Kramer versus James Friedman, case
number
5
6
7

C88- 3870.

Counsel , state your appearances for the record.

MR. MILLER:

Timothy Miller and Steven Dought ::t7 #

Ande rson & Watkins for the Defendant.

8

MR. ROGNLIE:

9

THE COURT:

10

Peter Rognlie, Burbidge & Mitchell.
Very well.

Who's going to argue?

Mr.

Miller?

11

MR. MILLER:

12

THE COURT:

13

(Whereupon, the Court conversed with other counsel

14

in an unrelated matter.)

15

THE COURT:

16

versus Friedman.

17

Yes, your Honor.
You may proceed.

Let's return to the matter of Xraner
Mr. Miller?

Let me state, counsel, I've reviewed the respective

18

memoranda submitted in this matter, as well as the attach-

19

ments, and so let's npt replow the same ground.

20

Mr. Miller.

21

MR. MILLER:

May it please the Court,

Go ahead,

counsel,

22

my name is Timothy Miller. Together with Steve Dougherty at

23

Anderson & Watkins, we represent Mr. James Friedman.

24

Friedman has moved for summary judgment on all of the ciains

25

contained in Mr. Kramer's Amended Complaint.

Mr.

I

1

In the Amended Complaint he seeks to recover on a

2

promissory note which Mr. Friedman executed in 1987 and I

3

will refer to that as the note from now on.

4

his second claim that the 1987 note contains an acknowledgment

5

of a loan which was allegedly made in 1981.

6

the loan as the 1981 loan, your Honor.

7
8

He states in

I will refer to

The third claim is a claim for fraud in the execution
of the 1987 note.

9

Now, the important facts in this case are as follows.

to

On March 12, 1981, Plaintiff wrote a check to Mr. Friedman.

11

He alleges that this check was part of a loan of $5,000 he

12

was making and he alleges that the loan was due and payable

13

within 90 days of March 12th, 1981.

14

March 21, 1987, Mr. Friedman executed a promissory note in

15

favor of Plaintiff for $15,000.

16

brought suit, first suing simply on the 1987 note.

17

amended the Complaint to state the other two claims.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Six years later on

On June 10, 1988, Mr. Kramer
Later he

Mr. Friedman has moved for summary judgment in this
action because no genuine issue of material fact exists
as to three facts in this action.
before the Court today.

The only material facts

First fact is is that Mr. Kramer

did not exchange consideration for the 1987 note.
because of a

This is

preliminary fact which is that the 1981 loan

was not evidenced, was not founded upon a written instrument.
Now, Mr. Kramer contends that the 1981 loan is

1

evidenced by the check and also by the 1987 note.

2

under the rule, under the rule of law by the Utah Supreme

3

4
5

'
7

I Court, the 1981 loan is not founded upon either.

10

11
12

To be

founded upon a written instrument an obligation must arise
I from that instrument, liability on the obligation must be
apparent from the face of the instrument, or the instrument
I must acknowledge the liability.
things.

*

However,

C!i<-ck does neither of these

Check is simply a check for $5,000.

payment for services.

It could be

It could be anything.

I state that it is part of a loan.

It does not

It does not state that

Mr. Friedman is liable to repay Lhe money to Mr, Kramer.
Similarly, the 1987 note does not refer to the 1981

13

loan in any way so that that obligation which was allegedly

14

incurred six years previously could not arise from that

15

1987 note.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Now, since as a matter of law the 1981 loan is not
founded upon a written instrument, the four-year Statute of
Limitations contained in 78-12-25 applies.

It applies from

the date that the note became due and payable and was
unpaid.

The Plaintiff has contended that the loan was due

and payable within 90 days of March 12, 1981, and thus,
the Statute of Limitations had expired on that loan by the
time the parties -- excuse me, Mr. Friedman executed the
| note in 1987

25
This is critical because the only consideration which

1

Plaintiff contends he gave in exchange for the 1981 loan

2

is -- or excuse me, for the 1987 note is related to the 1981

3

loan.

4

that loan, that he made the loan itself, that he forbore

5

collection efforts on that loan, and that he accepted a

6

compromised payment amount.

7

He has contended that he made interest payments on

None of these four things are effective or constitute

8

vH.l.jd consideration because at the time the note was

9

executed Mr. Friedman was not legally obligated to repay the

10

1981 loan.

11

loan.

12

At best, he was morally obligated to repay that

The Utah Supreme Court has held that a moral obligatiorj

13

to repay a debt is not sufficient to constitute considerdtior

14

in the same way, promises to accept a compromised pay-off

15

amount or to forbear collection efforts were meaningless

16

because at the time the promises were allegedly made,

17

Plaintiff could not collect on that obligation anyway.

18

The statute had alrendy run.

19

Finally, the fact that Mr. Kramer allegedly made

20

interest payments on his own debts can not constitute

21

consideration because those payments were made in the past.

22

He didn't bargain with Mr. Friedman to receive the 1, " note

23

by making payments on his own debts and thus, no considera™

24

tion supports the 1987 note and the first cause of action

25

fails as a matter of law.

1

Similarly, the third cause of action for fraud, even

2

assuming that Plaintiff could demonstrate the other eight

3

elements of fraud, the ninth element of injury is clearly

*

lacking in this case.

5

was harmed by, again, forbearing on the loan, foregoing

6

further collection efforts, and by accepting a compromise

7

pay-off amount.

8

executed, he could not collect on the 1981 loan anyway

9

because of the running of the Statute of Limitations.

Plaintiff has only contended that he

Again, at the time the 1987 note was

Any

10

injury in this regard stems from his failure to bring an

11

action on that loan, not from any alleged fraud.

12

Finally, the third material fact about which no genuin^

13

issue exists is whether the 1987 note constitutes or

14

contained a written acknowledgement of or promise to pay the

15

1981 loan.

16

in order to revive a stale debt, you must have an acknow-

17

ledgment of the debt or promise to pay the debt in writing.

18

The 1987 note does not refer to the 1981 loan at all.

19

The statute is very specific on this point.

As the Utah Supreme Court has stated, you must

20

expressly admit a liability is presently existing before

21

you have in writing acknowledged that liability.

22

in this case does not refer

23
24

25

This note

Lo the 1981 loan at all.

This isn't a closed case.

This isn't like the cases

J cited by Plaintiff where a document referred to the
existence of some obligation without identifying the specifi

1 obligation to which it refers.
2

In this case the note unambiguously friils to mention

3

the 1981 loan at all and thus, it can not constitute an

4

acknowledgment as a matter of law.

5

So in conclusion, Mr. Friedman has moved for summary

6

judgment because as a matter of law no consideration

7

supports the 1987 note.

8

show any injury from the alleged fraud and as a matter of

9

law the 1987 note does not contain a written promise to pay

Plaintiff has not shown and can not

10 or acknowledgment of the 1981 loan.
11

THE COURT:

12

Mr. Rognlie?

13

MR. ROGNLIE:

All right.

Thank you, Mr. Miller.

Thank you, your Honor.

14 to view this case not just by viewing the
15 ment that they entered into and the

f

f

It's important
81 loan arrange-

87 note even -is just

16 related transactions and they certainly were.

Friedman

17 even admits that in his deposition and I don't think that
18 is an excluded fact that they were related.

Friedman says,

19

"Yes, the '87 note that I wrote out, -jcive to Kramer, was at

20

least partially related to the '81 loan and there was a lot

21

of discussions about that at the time the note w.iS

22

exchanged."

23

The ca5-,<i really has to be looked at in regard to the

24

overall context of what occurred.

25

obviously, in »81.

The events started,

At that time Kramer and Friedman were

1 | very close, personal friends and Friedman in March of '81
2 | called Kramer to arrange for a loan.

He called him up

3| and said, "Listen, I'm in big trouble," and I'm paraphrasing,
4 I I'm not quoting from the deposition.
5 | I need money.

"I'm in big trouble.

I need $5,000 and I can't turn anywhere

6 I else to get it."

He admitted later in his deposition that

7 I he could not borrow that money from a commercial source.
8 |

He talked to Kramer and Kramer said, "Well, I don't
have it but I can get it for you somewhere, but it's

10

probably going to cost you a lot of money."

11

Friedman said, "Well, look into it."

12

So after that occurs, the same day, next day, what-

13

ever it was, Friedman is told by Kramer, Kramer says, "I

14

have a Shylock," I guess referring to the Merchant of

15

Venice, "on the street.

16

can get iL for you, but it's going to cost you a hundred

Fie can loan you the $5,000.

He

17 | dollars a week."
18

I

Friedman says, "Go ahead, I'll pay the hundred dollars

19 I a week, but get the money."

So Kramer arranges for the

20 I I0...1, forwards a personal check, and forwards the cash
21 (money he receives from the man on the street to Friedman.

22

'\fter that they originally had agreed to have that amount

23 | repaid in 60 to 90 days.

Friedman attempted to repay that

24 I by writing a check just for the principal amount a couple of
25

I months later.

I believe it was in May, and that check

8

1 bounces .
2

After that, we hit a series of conversations where

3

Kramer is repeatedly, usually by telephone but also sending

4

monthly statements, but also by telephone talking with

5

Friedman and saying, "Hey, I need the money."

6

basically responding «

7

every instance and probably can't recall every instance.

8

Says, "I know I owe the money.

9

need a little time."

I'm paraphrasing.

Friedman's

I can't quote

I'll pay you back, but I

10

And then we get then to a long series of extensions

11

of time requested by Friedman, granted by Kramer over the

12 course of six years.

We have Friedman basically

13 on his friend even further.

imposing

He's for the first year paying

14 a hundred dollars a week to the Shylock for interest on this
15 money and then after that is paying for the most part of
16 the time the prime rate plus two percent to cover money
17 that he had incurred under this loan arrangement with
18 Friedman.
19
20
21
22

It's important to remember that while we have those
repeated extensions of time, there's really only one basic
debt outstanding between the parties.

This isn't a case

where we're confusing services that are -- money payable for

23 services rendered or any other debt.

There's only one

24 debt from March of '81 through March of '87 and beyond
25

between these

_'/o parties, and there's never any dispute

when they have conversations as to who ower?> who money and
where that obligation stemmed from.
In March of '87 after Kramer had granted several
extensions of time to pay, the parti es decided and it is
true, Friedman suggested, I guess, that they resolve
the matter with a promissory note.
would finally put things in writing
Friedman in March of

f

The promissory note
It also would grant

87 until December of '07 to make the

final payment and Friedman prepared that note for $15,000
I plus interest as recited in the note which, in Mr. Kramer's
opinion, was a compromised amount.

That seems high, but

if you figure the fact that for the first year that he not
only owed $5,000 but was incurring interest at a hundred
dollars per week, he had well over $10,000 in debt just
after the first year, so after the remaining five he's
1 paying prime plus two and it's clearly over $15,000.
Nevertheless, he settled for a comp romised note and in that
time he agrees he will not sue or n.ike any other collection
efforts on that debt until such time as the note becomes
due and payable in December.
There are several issues of f act presented in this
case which preclude the granting of summary judgment.
The primary one is the question of when the '81 debt actually
became due and payable.

Granted, originally it was due and

payable as they agreed in 60 to 90 days or call it 90 days.

10]

1

Friedman made an attempt to repay the loan within that

2

time with a check that bounced.

3

time that he asked Kramer for additional time to pay.

4

After that was the first

The grant of an extension of time when the parties

5

get together, say, "I need another six months," and the

6

party who's owed the obligation grants that extension of

7

time, obviously the Statute of Limitations then gets

8

extended along with it, so if you and I have a debt that's

9

due in one year and after about ten months one comes to the

10 other and says, "We'll work some more time into the arrange11

ment, we'll go another six months," the statute then does

12

not run until after that additional six months begins to

13

run.

14

Kramer's testimony from his affidavit primarily and

15 also from his deposition is that at least once a year,
16

ahd that's probably a bare minimum, Kramer had conversations

17 with Friedman sometimes as often as every month or two
18 months, but during those conversations Friedman very con19

sistently, if not routinely, did a couple of things.

20 I k n i t t e d
21
22

to owing the money plus interest.

Me

Number two, he

promised he'd pay the money and if they hadn't discussed it
I recently, he usually concluded the conversation with

23 I something to '.he effect of, "I need more time and I'll pay
2*

you when I can, but I need more time," and at that request,

25

I Kramer would grant him more time, so in effect we have all

II

f

1

the way up until

2

asking for more time, Kramer granting it, and realistically

3

looking at it, the note itself was an agreement to grant

4

additional time from March of '87 until December of '87.

5

Therefore, the statute we think doesn't run.

6

87 when that note is delivered, Friedman

Therefs a renl question of fact as to whether that '81

7

debt became actually due and payable in 90 days and then

8

the statute began to run, or whether there were verbal

9

extensions of time which continued to put off the date when

10
11

the statute would begin to run.
The second major issue of fact revolves around the

12

question of consideration.

13

later and the third is the question of whether the '81 loan

14

is in any way related to the '87 note.

15

I'll discuss that a little more

Friedman in his pleadings, or at least in his motion

16

for summary judgment, maintains that it was not.

17

in his deposition he clearly agrees that it was at least

However,

18 partially related and as the events occurred here, there w^s
19

really no question th-at when that '87 note was exchanged,

20

Friedman admitted that he owed the '81 amount.

21

even in his deposition after the action was filed admitted

22

to owing that amount and there's really no question they're

23

related if the Court reviews the statements from the

24

deporii'-ion.

25

He later

If th<i'je is a question, it's a question for the trier

l_2j

1

of fact to decide and it isn f t a question that can be

2

decided on summary judgment.

3 J

4

The question of the consideration really has severdl
aspncts to it.

Kramer alleges more in terms of considera-

5 I tion than just the '87 loan and the interest payments made
6

there on, although clearly under Kuhn v. Mount

7

debt is sufficient to consideration to support the new

8

obligatione

9

that original

In their reply brief Friedman cites Manwill v.

10

Oyler to attempt to dictate a different result.

I think

11

that case can be distinguished for several reasons.

12

first is that the Plaintiff in Manwill v. Oyler conceded

13

the Statute of Limitations and the only consideration he

H

was asserting was the, quote, unquote, moral obligation

15

of the Defendant.

The

The Defendant attempts to use that case

1

6 J to say that a stale debt can not be revived.

I don't think

17

•ihfit's what the case says.

18

question of the moral obligation issue and in fact, that

The case merely addresses the

19 I opinion specifically recognizes the statute which permits
20

under the words of the case, an outlawed obligation to be

21 J renewed by written promise to pay, and the case does not

22 overrule

Kuhn v. Mount

that Kramer relies on to suggest --

23 I Lt f s clearly stated, I should say, that the original
24 J obligation supports the note.

25

The other consideration given by Kramer includes -- and

13

1

I address this in the memorandum and I won't go into it at

2

length, but includes the acceptance of a conpromised amount

3

which is clearly sufficient consideration, and in addition

4

to that, the forbearance on Kramer's part, his agreement

5

not to sue or make any further collection efforts in

6

exchange for that note, at least until the note became due.

7

Obviously, if it became due and Kramer didn't pay, '.he

8

understanding was that he would continue to either pursue

9

some collection efforts short of lawsuit or a lawsuit.

10

The Defendant also, I think, ignores pertinent

11

language of the Utah Code Section 78-12-25 sub 1 which

12

states that certain actions may be brought within four

13

years, quote, provided that action on all the foregoing

14

cases nay be commenced at any time within four years after

15

the last charge is made or the last payment is received.

16

Now, Friedman made a partial payment that, according to

17

his deposition testimony, he said was on the '31 loan.

18

granted it happened to occur after the promissory note was

19
20
21
22

exchanged.

Now,

The partial payment was either in December of

'87 or August of

f

8 8 , but even that partial payment will

?vsrve to revive the

f

81 obligation.

Even if the Statute of

Limitations had run as the Defendant maintains, the

f

81 loan

23

is also revived by operation of 78-12-44.

24

says in any case founded on a contract, when any part of

25

the principal or interest shall have been paid or an

That statute

14

1

acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim or

2

any promise to pay the same shall have been made, an action

3

may be brought within the period prescribed for the same

4

and for such payment, acknowledgment or promise-

5

it goes on to say the debt must be in writing.

6

And then

The clear intent of the parties when Friedman came up

7

with the idea of the note was to accomplish repayment of the

8

'81 debt by way of a compromised pay-off in the allowance

9

of additional time.

There really is no other plausible

10

interpretation of the facts in this case.

11

only thing on their mind.

12

That had to be the

Now, the defense says that you can't consider extrinsic

13

evidence.

14

evidence is clearly admissible here.

15

that discuss whether a document is facially deficient or

16

ambiguous or uncertain.

17

ambiguous or is not ambiguous or uncertain, then clearly it

18

states Friedman owes Kramer $15,000.

19

I

I believe that's incorrect.

The extrinsic
They cite the cases

If this document is indeed

If the Court needs to look further to discover more

20 J of the terms of that agreement, then it is ambiguous and
21 | extrinsic:
22
23
24
25

law.

evidence is admissible.

That's clear under Utah

The extrinsic evidence is overwhelming, really.
Friedman again -- and I don't mean to keep repeating

myself, but even at the time the note was exchanged, he'd
I been doing this for six years, but even at the time the note

15

1

was exchanged, the '81 debt admitted he owed that principal

2

amount plus interest, promised that he would pay Kramer that

3 money, and that the note was the means by which he would
4
5

accomplish that, that promise, and make that promise good.
There's no question that the two were related and that

6

the intent of delivering that note was to repay that debt

7

originally incurred in 1981. There was no other debt.

8

There was no money, other money, owed between the parties,

9

and the only other explanation Friedman can come up with as

10

to why that note exists is his statement that he gave the

11

note to Friedman so Friedman could use it in his divorce

12

action.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT:
MR. ROGNLIE:

You mean to Kramer?
To Kramer, yes, so Kramer could use it

in his divorce action, the theory being that if Kramer could
show more debt, more money -- excuse me -- mo.n* receivables
than he actually had coming in to him, he would somehow
benefit in the divorce action.
That doesn't hold up.

Clearly, if he was showing an

additional 15,000 in receivables, that would mean that his
wife would be looking for an additional $7,500 that Kramer
didn't have anc?s under Friedman's theory,
expect to get.

would never

That's the only other explanation for the

note that we have ever heard and clearly, that's not plausibl
The only plausible explanation is it was made to repay the
16

1
2

'81 debt.
As to the fraud allegation, I won't go to any length

3

to repeat what we've stated in our memorandum, although

4

clearly, if you have money that's owing to you and the

5

person refuse';

6

to that, according to Friedman, he signed the note basically

7

to defraud either Kramer or Kramer's wife in terms of this

8

divorce action explanation that he did.

9

is certainly implausible and Friedman admits in his

to pay it, you are injured.

In addition

That explanation

10 depo HCJJH.I.:? that the '81 debt and the note are at least
11

partially related, so there's a conflict in Friedman's own

12 testimony in his depo.
13

Really, what Friedman did by saying, "No, I gave

14 Dan-iy Kramer that note because he needed it for his
15 divorce," was attempt to blackmail Kramer into not collect16 ing a debt that was clearly owed.
17

Friedman, to recap it briefly, calls Kramer up in '81,

18 He needs the money bad and he gets the money and he agrees to
19 terms that you and I might not seem to think would be
20 reasonable, but they are the only terms available.
21

After

that, he begins to impose on his friend even further to

22 make interest payments for him and go to additional
23 measures and keeps putting out and eventually comes up with
24 the theory that this note is invalid, A, either because I
25 only gave it to him for his divorce which was -- but

I'm

17

using the term blackmail softly as an attempt to scare him
off from trying to collect, and then walks to court claiming
there was no consideration, et cetera, in an attempt to
avoid paying.
It's a case that, quickly summarized, involves two
people who used to be very good friends, one of whom loans
a substantial amount of money and paid a substantial amount
of interest for the other, and the other who's trying to bene
from

that under the eyes of the law, t^Ut- that money

and run with it, and that result, I think, would be
intolerable.

Thank you.

THE COURT:

All right, Mr. Rognlie, thank you.

Mr. Miller?
MR. MILLER:

Thank you, your Honor.

All of the facts presented by counsel are very
interesting.

However, none of them are material.

Even

assuming they are true, they do not affect this motion.
I want to take the partial payment first,.

The part of

78-12-25 which he cites refers to open accounts and is
not relevant to this case.

However, it is true that

78-12-44 includes a provision which says that partial
payment can revive a stale debt.

Unfortunately, Plaintiff

did not plead partial payment and under Utah law, where an
obligation is stale, where its enforceability is barred by
the Statute of Limitations, the act or the writing which

13

1

revives that must be pled.

2

Secondly, even assuming the alleged partial payment

3

was made, it does not affect the conclusion regarding

4

consideration and fraud.

5

was made significantly -- I mean, either December '87 or

6

August of

7

after the 1987 note was executed, so at the time it was

8

executed, even assuming the partial payment somehow revived

9

the 1981 loan, at the time that the note w.-ts executed, it

!

The claim is that partial payment

8 8 , sometime in that span, but significantly,

10

was not enforceable and therefore, it could not serve as

11

consideration.

12

He talks about Kuhn v. Mount.

Kuhn v. Mount is an

13

acknowledgment case and it does cite that the past debt is

14

sufficient consideration for an acknowledgment.

15

contest that, your Honor.

16

supposedly so clearly intended this to be an acknowledgment

17

had created an acknowledgment within the statute, had at

18

least referred to some existing obligation, we wouldn't be

19

here today, and it's true that the past obligation would

20

serve as consideration for that, but, your Honor, they

21

didn't.
1

We don't

We don't -- if the parties who

They didn't refer to the past obligation in th

e

1987 note and you can not go beyond the words of the statute

23 J to find an acknowledgment where none is.
24

'

25

«We do not have one here.

The statute requires an acknowledgment in writing,
We have a writing.

We have a 1987

19

1

note which doesn't refer to the previous obligation at all,

2

doesn't refer to the existence of an obligation, and it is

3

true that the note contains an unambiguous promise to pay

4

$15,000.

That is correct.

However, that promise is not

5

supported by consideration

6

papers and also today, so whether or not or even assuming

7

those two documents are related, even assuming everything

8

he said, the fact that they're related does not preclude

9

sunmary judgment because the statute doesn't say if two

as is shown in our moving

10

obligations are related, then one revives the other.

11

statute requires an acknowledgment in writing.

12

look at the note, there's no question that it, as a

The

If you

13 matter of law, is not an acknowledgment in writing.
14

Finally, he talks about when the 1981 loan was due

15 and payable.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

All I can rely upon is upon the Amended

Complaint which states that it was due and payable within
90 days.

Plaintiff has not suggested any grounds upon

which that Statute of Limitations would be pulled in this
case and thus, it expired before the note was executed
and could not serv'e as consideration for that note.
Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT;

All right.

Thank you, Mr. Miller.

Counsel, this is a particularly curious case because
it is fraught with the very issues that you're arguing here
today in rather classic form.

20

1

I am of the view that as

inequitable, Mr. Rognlie,

2

as it may be, that the limitations period in this case

3

did commence on the date that the Amended Complaint states

4

it did and based upon the testimony in the deposition of

5

Mr. Kramer.

6

I am, moreover, convinced that there has been no

7

acknowledgment to comply with the law of this state

B

that the consideration, alleged consideration, must fail

9

because there was no obligation owing at the time of the

10

note in March of '87.

11

that

and

I say this because I am of the view

if you choose to appeal this matter, and I would

12 certainly urge you to do so, it seems to me that it would
13 be more appropriate to have this issue resolved up front
14 before trial than after trial.
15

I recognize, and I think all parties agree, that Mr.

16 Kramer in good faith provided the money to Mr. Friedman,
17 his friend, and did make the interest payments on the money,
18 and I agree that Mr. Friedman's position at this stage,
19 that the money is not owed based upon these technicalities,
20 may not effect the morality of what's being done here,
21 but nevertheless, I think legally Mr. Friedman's position
22 is well taken.
23

I must grant the summary judgment.

Mr. Miller, you prepare the appropriate Order, and I

24 would urge you gentlemen to expedite this matter if you're
25

able on appeal because if for some reason I am reversed,

21

1

then we'll get the matter back on the trial calendar.

2

I'm afraid, given the status of the case at this point, I

3

have no alternative but to grant the summary judgment.

4
5
6

MR. MILLER:

But

Your Honor, should the Order include a

certification for appeal?
THE COURT:

I am of the view that it should and if

7

that's not objected to by you, Mr. Rognlie, I'll grant that

8

request.

g
10
H

MR. ROGNLIE:

I guess I don't object.

I have a

couple of preliminary questions.
One would be the issue of whether Kramer granted

12

extensions of time to pay and whether that then allowed

13

the statute --

14

THE COURT:

Oh, no, I'm not asking for an opportunity

15

for you to reargue your case.

16

have any objection to the request to certify this as a

17

final Order.

18

MR. ROGNLIE:

19

THE COURT:

I'm merely asking if you

No.
I'm of the view that's appropriate,

20

counsel.

This does extinguish the case if indeed

21

correct, and I may well be wrong, so I would agree that we

22

ought to cejtify it as a final Order so the matter can get

23

on the road if there's going to be an appeal.

24

Very well, counsel, thank you.

25

(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.)
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22
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12

thereat; that later I caused my said shorthand proceedings

13

to be transcribed into typewriting, and the foregoing

14

pages, numbered from 2 to 22, inclusive, constitute a full,

15

true and correct account of the same, to the best of my

16

I ability,
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'
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DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 28th day of
March, 1990,
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«^**fefrx£ /62jt*C6&; £$&ANNA M. BENNETT, CSR

23
24
25

_23j

PROMISSORY NOTE

$15,000.00

March 21, 1987
Salt Lake City, Utah

JAMES FRIEDMAN, hereby prom i..si.i.c; to p-»y »:o the order of
DANNY KRAMER the sum of Fifteen Thousand ($15,000) in lawful
currency of the United States on December 31, 1987.

The

principal amount v/ill bear and accrue interest at the base
rate (prime rate) quoted by First Interstate Bank, Salt Lake
City, Utah on the date hereof.

The principal and interest

may be paid prior to maturity hereof without prepayment
penalty.

The Maker hereby v/aives presentment and demand for
payment, notice of nonpayment, protest and notice of protest.
Maker further agrees to pay all cost of collection, including
reasonable attorneys' fees, if this* note is not paid at
maturity.
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